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Abstract—Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are emer-
ging as hardware security primitives. For so-called strong PUFs,
the number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) increases expo-
nentially with the required chip area in the ideal case. They can
provide a mechanism to authenticate chips which is inherently
unique for every manufactured sample. Modeling of the CRP
behavior through Machine Learning (ML) has shown to be a
threat however. In this paper, we exploit repeatability imper-
fections of PUF responses as a side channel for model building.
We demonstrate that 65nm CMOS arbiter PUFs can be modeled
successfully, without utilizing any ML algorithm. Data originates
from real-world measurements and hence not from simulations.
Modeling accuracies exceeding 97% are obtained, which is
comparable with previously published ML results. Information
leakage through the exploited side channel should be considered
for all strong PUF designs. Combined attack strategies, whereby
repeatability measurements facilitate ML, might be effective and
are recommended for further research.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a clear trend towards small, distributed, mobile
and wireless applications. They are typically integrated on
chip. Cryptographic protection is indispensable as almost all
applications process sensitive data, but is thwarted because
of the trend above. Energy/power and chip area are scarce
resources, so we are often limited to lightweight cryptography.
Furthermore, because of the mobility, one can easily gain
physical access to the chip. Hardware attacks, either invasive
or noninvasive, are thus a significant threat.
Classical cryptography heavily relies on the ability to store
secret information. Typically through binary storage of keys in
non-volatile memory, which is vulnerable to hardware attacks.
Also because of the permanent nature of storage which does
not pose limits on the time frame of the attacker. Circuits
that detect hardware invasion offer additional protection. Un-
fortunately they suffer from practical limitations. They might
be expensive, bulky, battery powered, avoidable and/or not
appropriate for lightweight environments.
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been pro-
posed as a more secure and more efficient alternative. PUFs
measure the unique variability of physical objects. They can be
manufactured in a variety of technologies: optical, acoustical,
magnetical, electrical and so on. PUFs which can be integrated
on chip, especially in CMOS technology, are by far the
most relevant for commercial applications. The manufacturing
variability of nanoscale structures is then measured.
PUFs are functions and produce a response when queried
with a challenge. Responses and challenges are both binary
vectors at the highest abstraction level. PUFs are often subdi-
vided in two classes, depending on the number of challenge-
response pairs (CRPs) [9]. Weak PUFs have few CRPs and
are typically utilized for on-the-fly secret key generation.
Strong PUFs have many CRPs, in the ideal case exponen-
tially increasing with the required chip area, and offer more
applications. It should be infeasible to capture all their CRPs
in a reasonable time span.
The most prominent strong PUF application is chip authen-
tication whereby only the verifier has to store secret infor-
mation. In an enrollment phase, the verifier collects arbitrary
CRPs from the chip and stores them secretly. In the verification
phase, the verifier picks a challenge and requests the PUF
response again. The returned response should match the one
in the database. A few erroneous bits are typically tolerated
hereby as PUF responses are noisy.
The security requirements differ per PUF class. For weak
PUFs, it is imperative to keep the responses on chip, as they
are post-processed to secret keys by so-called fuzzy extractors
[1]. Hardware attacks (invasive, through side channels and via
fault injection) should be taken into account. PUFs are often
assumed to be resistant against the first category. One can argue
that invasion damages the physical structure and hence also
the PUF. Experimental evidence is generally lacking however,
except for the coating PUF [12]. Electromagnetic radiation is
an exploitable side channel for ring oscillator (RO) PUFs [7].
For strong PUFs, CRPs can be obtained by anyone. The se-
curity arises from the CRP behavior unpredictability. It should
be infeasable to construct a clone via a mathematical model.
Modeling through Machine Learning (ML) algorithms, given a
training set of CRPs, is a major threat. The arbiter PUF, which
quantifies the variability of gate delays, can be modeled as such
[6]. Variants of the arbiter PUF which introduce additional
non-linearity (XOR, feed-forward, . . . ) provide more resistance
but can still be modeled [8].
Hardware attacks on strong PUFs should be considered
too, as they can facilitate modeling. Our main contribution is
to show that the noisiness of PUF responses can be exploited
as a side channel for modeling. Information leakage through
this channel should be considered for all strong PUF designs.
We demonstrate a successful attack on 65nm CMOS arbiter
PUFs without utilizing any ML algorithm.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the
required level of background information to make this text
self-sustaining. Meanwhile, the most important aspects of our
CMOS implementation are highlighted. Section III describes
a model for the repeatability of PUF responses, which is the
side channel being exploited. Subsequently, we describe and
analyze our attack schemes in section IV. In section V, we
present our results for the CMOS implementation and compare
them with previous work. Section VI concludes the work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Arbiter PUFs
Arbiter PUFs [6] measure structural variability via the
propagation delays of logic gates, like ring oscillator [10] and
glitch PUFs [11]. The high-level functionality is represented by
figure 1. A rising edge propagates through two paths with iden-
tically designed delays. Because of nanoscale manufacturing
variations however, there is a delay difference ∆tV between
both paths. An arbiter decides which path ‘wins’ the race
(∆tV ≶ 0) and generates a response bit r.
The two paths are constructed from a series of k switching
elements. Challenge bits ci determine for each stage whether
path segments are crossed or uncrossed. Each (binary) state
of each stage has a unique contribution to ∆tV . So challenge
vector ~c determines the arbiter time difference ∆tV and hence
the response bit r. The number of CRPs equals 2k.
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Fig. 1. Arbiter PUF.
CRP-based authentication with strong PUFs requires res-
ponses to have multiple bits. A single arbiter PUF produces
only a single response bit however. Two solutions, or a mixture
of both, are possible. First, one can implement multiple arbiter
circuits on the same chip, all having the same challenge as
input. Second, one can query a single PUF circuit with multiple
challenges and concatenate the responses.
Our 64-stage arbiter PUFs are manufactured in TSMC’s
65nm Low Power CMOS technology [3]. A variety of circuits
can serve as an arbiter. We chose for a NAND latch, as shown
in figure 2. Two cross-coupled NAND gates, implemented in
static complementary CMOS logic, determine and store the
response bit r. Initially inputs i1 and i2 are both zero so that
memory nodes r and r are both charged. A rising edge will
discharge one memory node and simultaneously lock the other.
It is important to match the delay of both NAND gates.
Otherwise, bias is introduced and the response bit generation
degrades to ∆tV ≶ ∆tB . Because the Probability Density
Function (PDF) of ∆tV is symmetrical with mean zero, the
probability of r to be 1 (or 0) is not 50% anymore. Our 65nm
CMOS arbiters are slightly biased in fact because response
readout logic is connected to node r only, so that is has a
higher capacitive load than node r.
i2
r
i1 r i2 i1 state
0 0 r = 1, r = 1
0 1 r = 1, r = 0
1 0 r = 0, r = 1
1 1 no change
}
Fig. 2. Arbiter circuit: NAND latch.
B. Modeling Attacks Using Machine Learning
Arbiter PUFs show additive linear behavior which makes
them vulnerable to modeling attacks. A single stage can be
described by two parameters, one for each challenge bit state,
as illustrated in figure 3. The delay difference at the input
of stage i flips in sign for the crossed configuration and
is incremented with δt1i or δt
0
i for crossed and uncrossed
configurations respectively.
∆tIN
i
ci = 0
∆tIN + δt0i ∆tIN
i
ci = 1
−∆tIN + δt1i
Fig. 3. Modeling.
The impact of a δt on ∆tV is incremental or decremental
for an even and odd number of subsequent crossed stages
respectively. By lumping together the δt’s of neighboring
stages, one can model the whole arbiter PUF with only k+ 1
independent parameters (and not 2k). A formal expression for
∆tV is as follows:
∆tV = ~γ~τ = (γ1 γ2 . . . γk 1)(τ1 τ2 . . . τk+1)
T
with ~τ =
1
2

δt01 − δt11
δt01 + δt
1
1 + δt
0
2 − δt12
...
δt0k−1 + δt
1
k−1 + δt
0
k − δt1k
δt0k + δt
1
k
and
~γ =

(1− 2c1)(1− 2c2) . . . (1− 2ck−1)(1− 2ck)
(1− 2c2) . . . (1− 2ck−1)(1− 2ck)
...
(1− 2ck−1)(1− 2ck)
(1− 2ck)
1

T
.
Vector ~γ ∈ {±1}1×(k+1) is a transformation of challenge
vector ~c ∈ {0, 1}1×k. Vector ~τ ∈ R(k+1)×1 contains the
lumped stage delays. Arbiter bias can be incorporated too, so
that the response bit is still the outcome of ∆tV ≶ 0:
τk+1 = δt0k + δt
1
k −∆tB .
High modeling accuracies can be obtained through ML
techniques like support vector machines and artificial neural
networks. Given a limited set of training CRPs, algorithms
automatically learn the input-output behavior by trying to
generalize the underlying interactions. The more linear a
system, the easier to learn its behavior. By using ~γ instead
of ~c as ML input, a great deal of non-linearity is avoided. The
non-linear threshold operation ∆tV ≶ 0 remains however.
In the paper proposing arbiter PUFs as a security primitive,
ML was already identified as a threat [6]. They reported
a modeling accuracy of 97% for their 64-stage 0.18µm
CMOS implementation. Idem for a more recent 65nm im-
plementation, also having 64-bit challenges [2]. Our attacks
are performed on the same 65nm chip. We circumvent the
∆tV ≶ 0 binarization by exploiting response repeatability
as a side channel. A full linear system is obtained, which is
straightforward to model.
C. Variability and Noise
The distinction between variability and noise is essential.
Both cause deviations with respect to the nominal beha-
vior. Measurements of structural variability, originating from
manufacturing processes, are reproducible. One can state that
they are defined by spatial distributions (and orientations) of
individual molecules of the solid materials. Noise however is a
non-reproducible temporal phenomenon. Generally speaking,
in electronic circuits, both variability and noise are undesired.
PUF circuits measure variability, but are bothered by noise as
well, as it reduces the repeatability. In this paper we exploit
the presence of noise to characterize the variability relevant
for response bit generation.
Both variability and noise are technology dependent. They
remain major design and manufacturing challenges, especially
while downscaling dimensions according to Moore’s law. Ran-
dom Dopant Fluctuation and Line-Edge/Width Roughness are
important sources of variability for CMOS devices [5]. White
thermal noise and 1/f noise affect the CMOS channel current
[4]. Interconnect is affected by Line-Edge/Width Roughness
and white thermal noise too.
Environmental conditions like temperature and supply volt-
age should be kept stable during PUF evaluation. That’s
because they have an impact on the variability-harvesting PUF
behavior.
III. PUF REPEATABILITY MODEL
Repeatability refers to the short-term reliability of the PUF
as affected by CMOS (and interconnect) noise sources. Long-
term device aging effects are not included. With R ∈ [0, 1], we
denote the fraction of the responses which evaluates to ‘1’ for
a certain CRP. The further from R = 12 , the more repeatable.
A. Model Description
The nominal delay difference ∆tV at the arbiter, with
respect to the set of all challenges, is assumed to be normally
distributed. This distribution has zero mean and standard
deviation σV , as shown in figure 4a. We collect the device
noise of all stages and of the arbiter in one equivalent noise
source at the arbiter input. An additional time difference ∆tN
is introduced, which we assume to be normally distributed with
zero mean and and standard deviation σN , as in figure 4b. At
the arbiter, we evaluate ∆t = (∆tV + ∆tN ) ≶ ∆tB . Fraction
R as shown in figure 4c is computed by integrating the noise
PDF:
R(∆tV ) =
1
2
erfc
(
∆tB −∆tV√
2σN
)
with erfc(t) =
2√
pi
∫ ∞
t
e−z
2
dz.
0
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(c)
1
~ci
0
PDF (∆t(~ci))
∆tB
(b)
1√
2piσN
~ci
0
PDF (∆tV )
(a)
1√
2piσV
−3σV 0
~ci
∆tV 3σV
Fig. 4. PUF repeatability model.
The key insight is that repeatability measurements provide
direct timing information, as expressed below. Knowledge of
neither σV nor σN is required for modeling purposes. Acquired
timing information is all relative, which is not a problem as in
the end we are only interested in the sign of ∆tV −∆tB .
∆tV (R) = ∆tB −
√
2σNerfc−1(2R).
B. Repeatability Measurements
Fraction R can be estimated by applying the same chal-
lenge many times (parameter M ). A measurement error R
produces an error ∆tV on the actual arbiter time difference.
For small ’s, the derivative d∆tVdR serves as a scaling factor:
∆tV =
√
2piσNexp
((
erfc−1(2R)
)2)
R.
We distinguish two error phenomena. First, there is the
discretization R ∈ {0, 1M , . . . , M−1M , 1}. The larger M , the
less significant this type of errors. Second, there are stochastic
errors. We consider a single PUF evaluation as a Bernoulli trial;
multiple evaluations then describe a binomial distribution. For
simplicity, we could define stochastic error R as the standard
deviation of the random variable R:
R =
√
R(1−R)
M
.
Stochastic measurement error R has a maximum at R = 12
and decreases monotonically towards R = 0 and R = 1.
Scaling factor d∆tVdR has an opposing effect and is the most
dominant. It has a minimum at R = 12 . Towards R = 0
and R = 1, it increases monotonically and approaches ∞
asymptotically. We prefer measurements around R = 12 , but
consider the whole 10− 90% region as reasonable.
C. Model Validation
We validate our model via the PDF of fraction R. An
analytical expression, which we match with experimental data,
is given below. We measured the reliability of one PUF circuit
for 65000 random challenges with M = 2000. A normalized
histogram serves as PDF. A nonlinear curve fitter iterating
over two variables, σN/σV and ∆tB/σV , provides the match.
Figure 5 shows an overlay of both PDFs. Only data in the
10− 90% region has been used for better visibility. Also note
the minor bias towards R = 0.
PDF (R) = PDF (∆tV (R))
∣∣∣∣d∆tVdR
∣∣∣∣ = σNσV exp

(erfc−1(2R))2 − 1
2
(
∆tB −
√
2σNerfc−1(2R)
σV
)2 .
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Fig. 5. Model validation.
IV. MODELING ATTACKS EXPLOITING DEVICE NOISE
A. Least Mean Square (LMS) Method
Figure 4c shows that R(∆tV ) is fairly linear for 10% ≤
R ≤ 90%: we call this the linear region. As ∆tV is a linear
combination of model parameters τ1 to τk+1, so is R in the
linear region (approximately). Consider a set of N training
CRPs in that region where each response is evaluated M
times: {~ci, Ri}. For N ≥ k + 1, we can simply solve the
(overdetermined) system of linear equations shown below in
a Least Mean Square manner. Numerically stable algorithms
are described in literature.
Γ~τ =

R1
R2
...
RN
 with ΓN×(k+1) =

~γ1
~γ2
...
~γN
 .
As suggested earlier, arbiter bias is included in element
τk+1. To predict the PUF response for a challenge ~c, one
should check whether R = ~γ~τ ≶ 12 . The predicted value of
R can also be utilized to estimate the prediction certainty:
the further from 12 , the better. This feature is not intrinsically
available for ML techniques like artificial neural networks.
One could improve the linearity by applying the trans-
formation below. For response prediction, one should check
whether ~γ~τ ≶ erfc−1(1) = 0. We do not apply this
transformation as we observe only very minor improvements
for the modeling accuracy.
Γ~τ =

−erfc−1(2R1)
−erfc−1(2R2)
...
−erfc−1(2RN )
 .
A major speed bottleneck is that most CRPs are very
repeatable and hence not suitable for modeling purposes. We
estimated that only 10.2% of the CRPs belong to the linear
region (averaged over 32 PUF instances, 20000 CRPs each).
Note that figure 5 already provided a rough estimate of this
fraction.
B. Differential Measurements Method
We present a second attack scheme which estimates the
elements of model vector ~τ one by one. Its performance
and usability are in all aspects inferior to the LMS method.
High modeling accuracies (> 95%) can be obtained too,
but much more PUF evaluations are therefore required. A
description of this method is very useful though. Additional
insights are provided and the essential idea might be recyclable
for attacking other strong PUFs. Results are not discussed.
Consider the following arbitrary challenge as a reference:{
~cREF = (c1 c2 . . . ck)
~γREF = (γ1 γ2 . . . γk 1).
One can choose challenges ~ci so that ~γREF and ~γi only
differ in element i, with i ∈ [1 k]:{
~c1 = (c1 c2 . . . ck)
~γ1 = (−γ1 γ2 . . . γk 1){
~c2 = (c1 c2 . . . ck)
~γ2 = (γ1 −γ2 . . . γk 1)
...{
~ck = (c1 . . . ck−1 ck)
~γk = (γ1 . . . γk−1 −γk 1).
Only τi then contributes to the difference of both arbiter
time differences:
∆tV,REF −∆tV,i = (~γREF − ~γi)~τ = 2γiτi.
In the linear region, τi is hence proportional with the difference
of fraction R. When applying the same arbitrary scaling factor
as for the LMS method, one can estimate τi as shown below.
Reusing repeatability measurements across different element
of ~τ , as suggested above, can provide a method speed-up.
τi =
γi
2
∆Ri with ∆Ri = RREF −Ri.
Similar as for the LMS method, one could apply a correct-
ion for the non-linearity:
τi ∝ γi
(
erfc−1(2Ri)− erfc−1(2RREF )
)
.
Estimating τk+1 is more complicated as arbiter bias cancels
out for differential measurements. One could estimate τ1 to τk
first and subsequently determine τk+1 so that the modeling
error with respect to a CRP verification set is minimized.
The usability of the method is somewhat limited for
elements of ~τ with large magnitude. Unfortunately, they are
the most important ones for predicting PUF responses. It
might be difficult or even impossible to fit two repeatability
measurements in the linear region. So in the worst case, only a
lower bound of τi can be provided. We encountered typically
a few problematic τi’s per arbiter circuit. As a solution, one
could estimate a smaller time difference τi ± τj instead, with
τj estimated before. Remark that the estimation error of τj
does propagate hereby.
C. Accuracy Analysis
We analyze and compare the accuracy of both methods.
The linear equations of the differential measurements method
are rewritten below, in conformity with the LMS method nota-
tion. To avoid unnecessary complications, we ignore potential
issues with large τi magnitudes. We also ignore the fact that
τk+1 is computed differently.
Γ~τ =
1
2

∆R1
∆R2
...
∆Rk+1
 with Γ =

±1 0 . . . 0
0 ±1 0
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . ±1
 .
For both methods, errors in the repeatability measurements
cause an error on PUF model vector ~τ , as shown below. The
magnitude of ~R is typically a factor
√
2/2 smaller for the
differential measurements method.
Γ(~τ + ~τ ) = (~R+ ~R) with Γ~τ = ~R.
To quantify the extent to which repeatability errors propa-
gate, one could compute the condition number κC of Γ. In our
case, a modified definition is much more appropriate. Model
error ~τ = Γ+~R is determined by the (pseudo)inverse of
challenge matrix Γ. Row i of Γ+ determines for τi to which
extent repeatability errors accumulate/cancel out. We sum the
elements in each row and average their absolute values:
κC =
1
k + 1
k+1∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
Γ+i,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
For the differential measurements method, the condition
number is always one. We performed a simulation for the
LMS method, as shown in figure 6. For different values of
N ≥ k + 1, we generated 1000 random challenge matrices
and averaged their condition numbers. Condition number κC
decreases monotonically with increasing N : rapidly in the
beginning and increasingly slower afterwards. As demonstrated
later in section V, very small values of M become feasible as
quantization errors are canceling out efficiently. The overall
performance is clearly superior to the differential measure-
ments method.
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
N
κC
Fig. 6. Condition number of the LMS method.
D. Query Algorithms
Only 10.2% of the CRPs are usable for modeling purposes,
which is the main speed bottleneck for our attacks. One might
try to increase this fraction by an adaptive query algorithm. As
discussed for the differential measurements method, one can
perform small steps of ∆tV . So a CRP in the linear region
might still be there after making such a small step. For optimal
performance, one should learn while querying.
We do not implement such an algorithm because it has
some major drawbacks. First, one should take into account
the method by which multiple response bits are generated.
Modeling a single PUF is more advantageous than modeling
many parallel PUFs. That’s because query algorithms can adapt
their behavior to maximally benefit only a single PUF. Second,
in case of the LMS method, the rows of Γ become strongly
correlated, which increases its condition number. Furthermore,
our paper only provides a proof-of-concept for the repeatability
side channel and is rather an ally than a competitor for
provenly fast ML approaches.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We want an accurate model while keeping the number
of PUF evaluations low. Three factors contribute to the total
number of PUF evaluations: the fraction of CRPs belonging
to the linear region, the number of measured CRPs in that
region (N ) and the number of PUF evaluations per CRP
(M ). We measure modeling accuracy via a verification set of
5000 randomly chosen CRPs. Each verification challenge was
evaluated M = 100 times on 32 PUF instances, with M2 = 50
as a response bit decision threshold.
Figure 7 demonstrates that the best trade-off is obtained
for very low values of M . That’s because quantization errors
are dealt with efficiently, as mentioned earlier. We plot the
modeling accuracy versus the number of PUF evaluations in
the linear region (NM ) for M ∈ {3, 14, 25}. The first model
can be constructed for N = k + 1 = 65 and the modeling
accuracy ramps up rapidly with increasing N afterwards. This
behavior is conform with the condition number simulation in
figure 6.
Table I provides numerical values of the modeling accuracy
for M ∈ {3, 5, 7}. The accuracy averaged over 32 PUF
instances and its accompanying standard deviation are listed.
Note that low values of M might enable an eavesdropping
attack in case of a majority vote, depending on whether the
vote is performed before or after response transmission.
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
70
75
80
85
90
95
 
 
3
14
25
Number of PUF evaluations in the linear region (NM )
%
M
Fig. 7. Modeling accuracy of the LMS method.
M
N 3 5 7
100 88.08%± 5.04% 92.36%± 2.61% 93.77%± 1.52%
200 94.20%± 2.27% 95.87%± 1.07% 96.40%± 0.83%
300 95.26%± 1.28% 96.57%± 0.82% 96.96%± 0.66%
400 95.81%± 0.87% 96.93%± 0.63% 97.22%± 0.57%
500 96.14%± 0.90% 97.11%± 0.67% 97.37%± 0.58%
600 96.39%± 0.72% 97.29%± 0.57% 97.44%± 0.56%
700 96.58%± 0.68% 97.40%± 0.57% 97.54%± 0.53%
800 96.73%± 0.59% 97.43%± 0.58% 97.56%± 0.54%
TABLE I. MODELING ACCURACY OF THE LMS METHOD.
The fraction of CRPs belonging to the linear region is
approximately constant, except for low values of M . Because
of the discretization of R, there is an asymmetry of the
available bins around R = 10% as well as R = 90%. For
M = 3, 5 and 7, the fraction of usable CRPs is 6.6%, 9.0% and
10.4% respectively (averaged over 32 PUF instances, 20000
CRPs each). For large values of M , this fraction is about
10.2%.
From previous paragraph and table I, we conclude that
an over 95%-accurate model can be constructed with less
than 15000 PUF evaluations. ML techniques require less than
5000 PUF evaluations and are hence faster, as confirmed by
measurements on the same chip [2]. The large amount of
repeatable responses is our main speed bottleneck: when taking
only usable CRPs into account, our method would be faster.
Furthermore, an eavesdropping attack is always possible with
ML, so it is still the recommended approach to model arbiter
PUFs.
We propose joined efforts instead of competition however.
The response repeatability side channel could facilitate a ML
attack. Analog information is obtained from digital response
bits and could be used as ML input. The arbiter PUF, its vari-
ants (XOR, feed-forward, . . . ) and other strong PUF designs
might be more vulnerable than with ML only. We propose this
analysis as further work.
VI. CONCLUSION
Response repeatability can be exploited as a side channel
for modeling strong PUFs. Information leakage through this
side channel should be considered for all strong PUF designs.
As a proof-of-concept, we were able to successfully model
65nm arbiter PUFs without utilizing any ML algorithm. We
propose a combined attack strategy in which the device noise
side channel could facilitate ML.
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